ARRESTING BANKING PANICS: FED LIQUIDITY PROVISION AND THE FORGOTTEN PANIC OF 1929

I. Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008-9 saw markets and institutions suffer from illiquidity and insolvency. These factors can interact and feed off of each other. For example, if market participants lower the valuations of the assets on financial intermediaries' balance sheets, it may call into question the solvency of these firms, prompting collateral calls and a flight by suppliers of short-term funds. An inability to obtain accurate information on the fundamental values of assets on balance sheets might also lead intermediaries to become unwilling to lend to each other.
As institutions worry about their own need for capital and their ability to meet investor withdrawals, they may retrench, hoard liquid assets, and fail to provide funds to other distressed financial institutions; in extreme conditions, the need to raise cash can result in asset sales at depressed prices (a "fire sale") so that liquidity problems can accentuate solvency concerns (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009, Diamond and Rajan 2005) . In addition, worsening concerns over solvency can increase the likelihood of a liquidity crisis or a run on a financial institution.
And when creditors begin to worry that other creditors have similar fears, a panic may ensue (Morris and Shin 2000 , Diamond and Rajan 2006 , Tirole 2011 .
The response of a central bank or lender of last resort to banking crises often involves gauging the relative importance of illiquidity and insolvency (Goodhart 1999) . The larger role that illiquidity plays in the crisis, the more vigorously a lender of last resort may deem it necessary to extend credit in order to quell a panic. 1 Indeed, at least since the writings of Bagehot (1873), central bankers have noted the importance of liquidity provision in arresting panics. 2 In 1 Summers (2000) emphasizes that preventing banking crises depends on avoiding "situations where the bank run psychology takes hold." 2 Bagehot (1873, p.11) noted the importance of confidence when bankers' liabilities are viewed as liquid by creditors. He pointed out that confidence is crucial when the financial institution's own liabilities are many circumstances, central banks can provide liquidity more efficiently than private agents, since the former can expand and contract liquidity at lower cost than the latter (Gorton and Huang 2004) . During the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced a host of lending programs to provide substantial liquidity support to financial markets and institutions (Bernanke 2009 ).
The recent crisis is hardly the first time that illiquidity and insolvency have severely damaged the U.S. financial system. The financial history of the United States is replete with major banking panics that swept the nation as well as more localized episodes. 3 This paper investigates a previously neglected panic that occurred just prior to the onset of the Great Depression, one which sheds light on how panics develop and spread and how different lenderof-last-resort actions can contribute to ending them. In April 1929, a Mediterranean fruit fly epidemic struck the citrus crop in Florida (a remarkably clear shock that started this episode). In order to prevent its spread to other states, the government quarantined Florida citrus shipments and destroyed infested groves. Over the course of that spring, it seemed increasingly unlikely that farmers would be able to repay their crop loans when they came due during the fall. Congress considered compensating Florida farmers for their losses, but recessed at the end of June without taking action. The size of losses that farmers would suffer, the effectiveness of the eradication campaign, and whether the government would compensate growers were all unknown.
This economic uncertainty created concerns about the health of bank balance sheets. In
July 1929, depositors responded by withdrawing funds from banks, culminating in bank runs in viewed as very liquid by its creditors. In order to meet creditors' demands, banks must hold cash (or its near equivalent). Banks or other financial institutions experience illiquidity when demand for its liabilities outstrips its ability to provide them in the short run. Theoretically, a bank might be able to hold sufficient reserves to prevent illiquidity, but it would be neither profitable nor socially optimal (Bernanke, 2008) . 3 Of the voluminous literature on the bank failures of the Great Depression, perhaps most germane to the approach of this paper is the important work of Wicker (1996) , which discusses how banking panics during the Great Depression occurred through an interbank transmission mechanism. Richardson (2007a Richardson ( , 2007b highlights the importance of correspondent relations during the financial panics of the early 1930s. This paper builds on the tradition of Wicker (1996) and later work by Calomiris and Mason (2003) in that identifies why and how banks can experience liquidity shocks. Those papers, in turn, draw on the asymmetric-information view of bank liquidity problems as posited by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) , Calomiris and Gorton (1991) , and others. Reserve Bank of Atlanta shipped large sums of currency to the vaults of the two remaining large correspondent banks in Tampa on July 17 and 18, and publicly promised to provide enough cash to cover all deposits at member banks. By July 20, the run had subsided.
We have assembled a new micro-level database on commercial banks in Florida that allows us to show that deposit outflows prior to the banking panic in July were heaviest in areas subjected to the quarantine -evidence consistent with concerns that the fruit fly and the eradication program were directly affecting banks. Data on Florida's bank correspondent networks allows us to demonstrate how the panic then spread. Deposit withdrawals at banks in the citrus growing areas put pressure on correspondent banks. Correspondent banks were important liquidity providers, and we show how pressure on the major correspondent banks impacted other banks. The evolution and nature of the Florida banking panic is consistent with models emphasizing how factors affecting the asset side of bank balance sheets, such as uncertainty over payoffs or delays in investment projects, can trigger bank runs (Morris and Shin 2000, Diamond and Rajan 2005) as well as those emphasizing linkages through bank networks (Allen and Gale, 2000) .
This response of the Atlanta Fed demonstrates how bold, transparent, and targeted liquidity support by central banks can be vital in halting the spread of a panic and altering depositor confidence during a crisis even when the root of the crisis is clearly a solvency shock.
Archival evidence from the minutes of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (the Atlanta Fed)
shows that officials at the reserve bank were concerned with the panic spreading to institutions they viewed as solvent after 8 percent of the state's banks failed within 48 hours of the closure of Citizens National Bank. Officials rapidly provided unconventional liquidity support in Tampa to key banks whose closure they believed would result in a further wave of bank failures. We show that the response by the Atlanta Fed appears to have successfully stemmed the banking panic, changed depositor expectations, and prevented other institutions from failing.
To get a sense of the importance of the intervention by the Atlanta Fed, we use individual bank balance sheet data on the population of Florida banks to construct several counterfactuals.
We estimate that bank failure rates would have been twice as high in Florida without the Atlanta Fed's decision to provide funds to the key correspondents in Tampa that were facing runs.
Additional results suggest that the intervention likely prevented banks from exhausting their liquid reserves, again helping to arrest the panic.
Finally, the Atlanta Fed's response to the panic in Florida illustrates some of the tools that were available for responding to liquidity crises on the eve of the Great Depression, and how policymakers at one of the regional Federal Reserve Banks viewed their role as a lender of last resort. The Atlanta Fed's response is particularly noteworthy since the Federal Reserve has been criticized for not responding to the banking panics of the 1930s and for having little or no experience acting as a lender of last resort during the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) . Given the actions of the Atlanta Fed in 1929, the response by the Federal Reserve to the banking panics in the 1930s, or lack thereof, is that much more intriguing.
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The next section of the paper describes the events that triggered runs on the Florida banking system in the summer of 1929 and relates it to the theoretical literature on banking crises.
Section III then describes the policy response of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta after the 4 That said, Fed officials may have misinterpreted the banking problems of the 1930s, believing that high reserves and low nominal interest rates signaled that there was plenty of liquidity in the system (Meltzer 2003) . It thus may have been easier for the Atlanta Fed to identify a more localized liquidity problem in 1929 than it was for the Fed to view correctly that 1930-33 was a national liquidity problem.
failure of Citizens Bank. Section IV analyzes of the causes of bank distress and the effects of lender-of-last-resort intervention. Section V concludes.
II. The Fruit Fly Infestation and Bank Runs
To understand how a solvency shock associated with the quarantining of fruit-fly-infested areas spread into a mid-1929 banking panic in Florida, we first discuss the Mediterranean fruit fly infestation that began in April of that year. We then provide an accounting of the bank runs and the response of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta to the banking distress.
A. Florida Citrus and the Mediterranean Fruit Fly Infestation: The Real Shock
In 1929, Florida's groves contained nearly 9 million orange and 3.5 million grapefruit America in the 1920s. Its lifecycle allowed it to spread rapidly once it gained a foothold.
Generations matured in two to four weeks and the fly had no natural predators or parasites in the U.S. In regions where the fly had become endemic, including Australia, Bermuda, Brazil, South Africa, Spain, the West Indies, Hawaii, and nations around the Mediterranean, farmers were forced to abandon commercial cultivation of most fruits and vegetables.
State and federal governments therefore reacted swiftly to the outbreak. Florida immediately quarantined areas around infected orchards and prohibited shipments of fruits and vegetables. Florida's governor mobilized National Guard troops to enforce the quarantine. All vehicles passing out of the quarantine area were disinfected by washing the exterior and spraying insecticide in the interior of them. The federal government imposed a broader quarantine, including inspections of all trains leaving the state. The United States Department of Agriculture dispatched 20 scientists and several hundred workers to aid the eradication effort. California, the other major citrus growing state, also dispatched a contingent. Eventually, more than 5,000
people worked in the eradication campaign (Los Angeles Times, July 21, p.1 and July 22, p.1).
Officials devised a multilayered defense. Zone 1 was the territory one mile around an infested orchard, and within this area, authorities destroyed all orchards, crops, and wild plants in which the fly might reside. To kill the larvae, laborers burned all fruit found on the ground or buried the fruit at least three feet deep and covered it with motor oil and disinfectant. To kill adult flies, workers fumigated infested areas with arsenic sprays or mercury smoke. Authorities imposed Zone 1 restrictions on over 400 independent infestations, mainly in the center of the state, encompassing over 17,000 acres of citrus groves ( Figure 4 shows counties with orchards designated Zone 1). Zone 2 stretched for a radius of nine miles outside Zone 1. All fruit on the vine was destroyed and previously picked or processed fruit could not leave Zone 2 without rigorous inspection and certification as pest free. 
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Despite the Atlanta Fed's initial attempts to alleviate distress by allowing nonmember banks to rediscount through member banks, the withdrawals proved too great for key correspondents in the citrus areas to handle on their own. Steady withdrawals by country banks 11 Currency funds were established upon the recommendation of a Reserve Bank and the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. The first currency fund was established in 1921 in the twelfth district and a few others were established in various locations between that time and the episode described here. Currency at the custodian bank was considered part of the cash balance of the Reserve Bank. Withdrawals of currency placed at the custodian bank by member banks required approval of the Reserve Bank overseeing the currency fund. Custodians pledged marketable securities with the Reserve Bank and assumed all liability associated with the currency fund.. 12 One could think of rediscounting paper for Citizens Bank and its Bank Group as an effort to provide support to a particular institution while the revolving currency fund was a general program that could provide liquidity support to a number of institutions.
were straining correspondents in Tampa, the financial hub of the citrus industry. 13 The large correspondent banks in Tampa over the solvency of banks appears to have added a severe liquidity dimension by mid-July.
C. Closing Banks during the Panic
During the summer of 1929, nearly all the bank suspensions resulted in banks being put into liquidation by regulators, and hence were classified as bank failures. The primary reason for the banks being put into liquidation had to do with the procedure used by Florida bank regulators to deal with banks that closed their doors, even temporarily. Florida's banking law required examinations of all banks that ceased making payments to depositors (or other creditors). Banks that could demonstrate solvency, sound reasons for suspending payments, and the ability to reopen when the crisis passed were permitted to keep their doors closed temporarily. Banks that could not prove these points were placed in receivership. Since Florida banks had trouble proving the first two points in the spring and summer of 1929, they were liquidated.
14 The typical Florida bank placed half of its assets in loans and discounts, most of which financed the revolving credit needs of local businesses. The fruit fly infestation reduced the value of these loans since the likelihood of repayment depended on the success of the eradication 14 Upham and Lamke (1934) note that regulators of both state and national banks required banks to mark bonds and securities to market. Rigorous evaluation of closed banks was especially likely to have been the case in Florida where Dovell (1955) So, banks that suspended operations during the fruit-fly panic faced scrutiny of their balance sheets at a time when the bulk of their assets had depreciated in value. Rules required examiners to mark these assets at their market or liquidation value. These markdowns turned almost all suspensions into bankruptcies when bank regulators turned their charges over to the courts, the agency which supervised receiverships and liquidations of banks in Florida.
D. Discussion
The evolution of the Florida banking panic appears consistent with some recent theoretical models. In Morris and Shin (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) , depositors receive a noisy signal regarding the health of a financial institution. Based on this signal and their beliefs about the actions that other depositors might take, depositors decide whether to withdraw.
The distribution of signals determines whether a bank experiences a run. A unique run/no run equilibrium outcome is determined by the distribution of signals. In these models, there are levels of signals where the bank clearly survives or fails, but also a region where the equilibrium is selffulfilling in the sense that a bank would be forced to liquidate assets inopportunely and become insolvent if there is a run or remain solvent if there is no run.
During the Florida panic, there appear to have been signals that caused depositors to withdraw their funds. In citrus growing areas, the signal was the potential losses due to the infestation and the lack of government reimbursement following the eradication. For Tampa, the signal appears to have been the closure of Citizens Bank, which was an indication that banks with strong ties to the citrus growing region or with large correspondent networks were vulnerable. As the panic dissipated in the face of liquidity rather than solvency support, it suggests that there may also have been some self-fulfilling aspects to the runs.
Another class of models shows how concerns about the solvency of some (or all) banks can morph into panics that engulf the entire financial system. Recent examples of this type appear in Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Tirole (2011) ; in these models, creditors concerns about the solvency of certain banks grow when they begin to worry whether other creditors have similar fears and then begin to worry about the strategic relationship between their decisions. Strategic concerns eventually dominate calculations of creditors (i.e. depositors), who flee towards liquidity, as the panic spirals out of control. The historical record suggests such a progression.
Accounts of the crisis in June and early July emphasize uncertainty about the solvency of particular institutions. Reports from the middle and end of July emphasize depositors' fears about widespread withdrawals and the rush to be the one that withdraws first.
The spread of the crisis through the correspondent networks is similar to some of the recent theoretical work by Allen and Gale (2000) , who emphasize linkages that can transmit panics. They show that if bank networks are incomplete, then solvency shocks in one area can generate liquidity problems and then solvency problems in other areas. This idea matches the observation that runs spread from banks in the citrus growing areas to Tampa where the focus of concern appears to include the potential impacts from the failure of other banks.
III. The Atlanta Fed's Response following the failure of Citizens Bank
The According to newspaper accounts, when the second shipment of Fed money arrived, the runs on the two Fed member banks in Tampa subsided: "while a number of depositors withdrew their money, the bank officials reported, at closing time, that the deposits during the day had exceeded withdrawals…Indications were that confidence had been restored and that in the next few days most of the money withdrawn yesterday and today will be returned to the vaults of the banks. The arrival of $5,000,000 here today and yesterday from the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank and the sight of the money in huge stacks in the cages of the bank tellers had a reassuring effect. 15 The minutes of the Atlanta Fed's discount window committee indicate that Exchange National borrowed a bit over $1,000,000 on July 20, 1929 through the discount window. It is possible that the cash related to this loan was drawn from the revolving currency fund.
Crowds about the banks were much smaller than yesterday and were there out of curiosity…a run continued in Ybor City, but officials were able to meet all demands by depositors" (Financial Chronicle, Saturday, July 20, 1929, p.422) .
The intervention in Tampa illustrates the bold response of the Atlanta Fed to a run on the banking system. First, the Bank's policy was highly visible and transparent: high-ranking Reserve
Bank officials came to the scene of the panic to reassure depositors that their accounts were safe.
Second, the policy response was overwhelming rather than incremental in the sense that large amounts of cash made were immediately made available. The statement that enough money would be sent to pay every depositor certainly indicated that strong measures were being applied to address the situation. The observable movements of currency being brought to the affected area There were large runs upon both the First National Bank of Tampa and the Exchange National Bank of Tampa. Deputy Governor Taylor was present during these runs and aided in every way that he could in supplying necessary currency. Large sums were sent by airplane by the Jacksonville Branch and large shipments were made by mail. On the first day of the run upon these two banks $1,700,000 was withdrawn from the First National Compensation for growers never materialized, but optimistic prognostications concerning cultivation eventually bore fruit. Before the panic in July, newspaper accounts had predicted the widespread destruction of groves, massive losses to citrus growers, a multiyear effort to eliminate the pest, and the wholesale destruction of the citrus industry. The eradication campaign intensified over the spring and into the summer as additional resources reached the region and experience gained over the preceding months on how to destroy the pest increased the efficiency of those on the front lines. Newspapers do not mention any substantial developments around the time of the panic, but instead suggest considerable uncertainty as to whether the efforts would succeed. 19 As it turned out, the quarantine effects were working as "no trace of the pest [was] fruit to be shipped from orchards more than 10 miles from the nearest infestation.
Even though the call money market remained tight in the last week of July, the New York Times reported that the Florida banking crisis had hit rock bottom by the end of the month (New York Times, July 25 and 28). Evidence from our bank failure series suggests it took until the end of August for the solvency shock associated with the fruit fly to work its way through the banking system.
IV. Empirical Analysis of the Florida Panic
In order to understand the effects of the real shock on the Florida banking system, the subsequent liquidity crisis, and the Fed's response, we assemble a new micro-level database on The correspondent networks play an important role as the transmission mechanism and Table 1 provides some summary statistics of these relationships. We define a major correspondent as any hub institution that had at least seven respondents (banks that received clearing, liquidity, and other services from the correspondent). 22 There are nine such institutions 22 Events at institutions in Miami with seven correspondents are discussed by Atlanta Fed officials. The discussion suggests that these banks were viewed as at least somewhat important correspondents. Our list of major correspondent banks includes all institutions with at least as many respondents as the Miami institutions.
in Florida at the start of 1929, located in Jacksonville, Tampa, Miami, and Pensacola. All but a handful of banks had relationships with at least one of these institutions and many had multiple relationships. The table also shows that about half of the banks that used Citizens bank as a correspondent also had a relationship with at least one other institution, suggesting how the failure of Citizens Bank could have been a source for contagion and bank runs. Many of the major correspondent banks had respondents located in the areas subject to the quarantine, although Citizens Bank had the largest share of respondents in these areas.
A. Deposit Analysis
To provide some insight into the evolution of the crisis, we make use of the unique data we collected on deposits and correspondent relationships. We first document that deposit outflows are most significant in areas that were clearly affected by the quarantine. As banks in these areas were exposed to the initial solvency shock, it would be natural for risk-averse depositors or other banks to remove some of their funds from these banks. This is what we observe. Table 2 shows that deposit outflows from March until June were much greater in areas where the eradication efforts were centered than in other areas. In areas that were quarantined, deposit outflows were, on average, twice as large as in non-quarantined areas (7.2% versus 3.6% over the four months).
The historical record suggests that these country banks began drawing down reserves in Tampa banks as depositors in citrus-growing areas steadily withdrew funds. As described above, Citizens' Bank, with deposits of more than $13 million, suspended operations on July 17, 1929 as a result of deposit withdrawals, which then triggered runs on other banks in Tampa and the surrounding areas.
23 23 The correspondent banks appear to have little direct exposure to seasonal agricultural loans or seasonal loans to processors of agricultural outputs. The principal correspondent banks located in Tampa, Miami, and Jacksonville had loan portfolios that consisted primarily of commercial loans to businesses in the cities where they had a physical presence. Their secondary reserves appear to have been corporate and municipal Deposit data again shed light on the pressure that the key correspondent banks in Tampa were facing. were not a part of the group also saw sharp declines in deposits -losing roughly 20 percent of their deposits in the four months prior to July. These declines were much more pronounced than declines at banks not affiliated with Citizens Bank (4.7 percent), consistent with the notion that Citizens and its respondents were facing significant pressure from depositors and suggesting why it sought succor from the Atlanta Fed. As Table 4 shows, even prior to the failure of Citizens, the two other national banks in the city, First National of Tampa and Exchange National of Tampa, and their correspondents also faced significant depositor withdrawals; these two banks lost roughly 10.6 and 7.3 percent of their deposits in the four months preceding the July panic.
Another type of financial institution that existed in Florida in 1929 provides additional perspective on the panic. During the crisis, Florida's 68 building and loan societies (B&Ls) experienced few withdrawals and no failures. Nevertheless, B&Ls faced substantial exposure to declines in agricultural incomes because the majority of their investments were mortgages for local real estate, whose value would decline if farmers' incomes fell. However, B&Ls lacked exposure to contagion since they did not rely on the commercial banking system's correspondent network, and because they did not offer demand deposits. B&Ls offered only time deposits, in the form of mutual shares and certificates of deposit. B&L's need not convert the former to cash, since mutual shares represented equity in the organization. B&L's need not pay out the latter prior to the maturity date, and even then, could require 30 days' notice of intent to withdraw.
Building and Loans were not, therefore vulnerable to liquidity shocks, which is a likely reason bonds issued by entities outside of their local areas. These practices were the standard investment strategy for commercial banks at that time. The Atlanta Fed intervened on July 17 by shipping currency to Tampa and publicly announcing support for institutions under pressure. These efforts appear to have successfully restored confidence in these banks. As shown in Table 4 , deposits from June (prior to the panic) through September were little changed (with median values approximately equal to zero) at banks having correspondent relationships with the two remaining key banks in Tampa.
B. Did the Fed's Intervention Prevent Solvent Banks from Failing?
The historical narrative and data on deposits suggests that a banking panic occurred in Tampa in mid-July 1929 and was spreading throughout the Florida banking system. A key 24 The Building and Loan system resembled the commercial banking system in many dimensions that make it a plausible control group. B&L's operated in every county in the state. Several dozen B&L's operated in the counties caught up in the fruit-fly crisis. B&L's invested almost entirely in local real estate, and thus, faced substantial losses from shocks that threatened farmers' incomes and property values. No B&Ls failed during the fruit-fly panic, and only two failed during the year that followed. By the trough of the depression in 1933, however, nearly half of all B&L's fell into insolvency or survived as zombies with the bulk of their assets consisting of foreclosed real estate. 25 These calculations compare the declines of $1,200,000 and $1,700,000 in deposits for Exchange National and First National, respectively, with March (pre-panic) values of deposits.
question is whether the Federal Reserve's intervention in Tampa mattered such that otherwise solvent banks were able to survive the panic. 26 We address this question using several counterfactual scenarios.
To construct these counterfactuals, we first determine the probability of failure of individual banks over different time horizons. 27 We divide 1929 into four periods:
• Period 1: June 26-July 16 -after Congress adjourns with no compensation to citrus growers (11 failures);
• Period 2: July 17-July 20 -Citizens Bank in Tampa fails, Tampa panic occurs (7 failures);
• Period 3: July 21-August 5 -following the Fed intervention with support to two Tampa national banks (7 failures); and
• Period 4: August 6 until the end of the year -the period after last bank fails due to deposit losses and the panic subsides (4 failures).
We estimate a logit regression using individual bank data that includes information regarding the correspondent relationships (which we argue served to transmit the shock), exposure to the fruit fly eradication program, and the expected probability of survival from a first-stage regression using pre-crisis period characteristics. The second-stage logit regression takes the form:
(1) Fail/No Fail = f (period, major correspondent in Jacksonville, period*major Florida nonJacksonville correspondent, period*major Florida non-Jacksonville correspondent fails, other bank in county experiences a run in current or preceding period, quarantine zone county, period*expected survival probability from first stage. 26 Records of the Discount Window Committee from the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank list discount loans made by the Atlanta Fed in 1929. During this period there were generally 10 to 12 borrowers from Florida each day. Regression analysis does not find a systematic relationship between discount window loans to banks in Florida in the weeks leading up to Citizens Bank's failure and a change in the failure/survival outcome during the panic period. 27 We drop banks that were members of Citizens Bank Group from the analysis from here forward as their fate was dependent on that of the main bank.
The nine major correspondent banks are divided into two groups: those in Jacksonville and those outside Jacksonville. (A branch of the Atlanta Fed was located in Jacksonville and would have been able to directly provided liquidity to institutions located there so any Federal Reserve intervention there would have been different.) Since we are interested in estimating the effects of the nine major correspondents on respondents, we exclude these banks from the estimation. Of the major Florida correspondents, Citizens Bank is the only one that failed in 1929.
To construct the first-stage regression, we use balance sheet information from all Florida commercial banks in existence in January 1929 to examine whether these bank characteristics were good predictors of failure in the pre-crisis period. Our predictors for suspension are (log) total assets, interest-earning assets as a share of total assets, bonds and securities' share of interest-earning assets, net worth to total assets, surplus and undivided profits to net worth, cash to deposits, whether the institution was a state bank, the (log) age of the bank, and the (log) population of the town where the bank is located. Table 5 shows logit (maximum likelihood)
estimates of the probability of suspending prior to June 26 (just before Congress adjourns without appropriating funds to reimburse orange growers and before the banking panic begins) based on 1929:Q1 characteristics.
Generally consistent with previous studies, the results from the first-stage regression
show that that, all else equal, banks were less likely to suspend when they held more bonds relative to loans (bonds tended to be less risky and more liquid), when their net worth consisted to a greater extent of undivided profits and the surplus fund (which are more reflective of retained earnings and profitability of the bank), when they held more cash to deposits (the bank is more liquid), were older, and were located in a larger town. These regressions reveal that measures of bank health (reflecting solvency, liquidity, portfolio risk, and owner's exposure among other factors) were correlated with failure in much the same way as other studies of bank failures during this period Mason 1997, 2003; White 1984; Carlson 2010 ).
These failure regressions establish a baseline that we use in the second stage to provide an indicator of the health of each bank coming into the banking panic. That is, since these regressions use balance sheet data and failure information from the period prior to the panic, we use the predicted probabilities of survival from them as ex ante measures of the condition of each bank on the eve of the panic.
Regression results estimating equation (1) are shown in Table 6 . As one would expect,
given the source of the shock, being in a county in which the infestation occurred increased the likelihood of failure; banks in these counties were about four times more likely to suspend than other banks. The expected survival probability from the first-stage regression also tends to decrease the likelihood of failure, suggesting that banks that were healthier before July were less likely to fail. We find that being in the vicinity of bank runs tended to increase the likelihood of failure. 28 Overall, the regression reasonably predicts failure over the year. The average predicted probability of failure conditional on the banks failing is 15 percent whereas the average predicted probability of failure conditional on having survived the panic is 3 percent.
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We find that having a major correspondent bank fail notably increased the odds that its respondents would fail; such institutions were over 10 times more likely to suspend than other banks. There are a few potential reasons for this finding. First, the major correspondents served as a source of liquidity for their respondents and having this source dry up, especially during a panic, may have prompted some banks to close their doors. Correspondents also provided important clearing services for their respondents and the loss of the correspondent may have 28 A bank run is said to occur in the vicinity if the bank examiners reported that another bank in the county was closed due to heavy withdrawals during the period (as described earlier in this section) or the preceding period. 29 We have run versions of these regressions with a wide array of right-hand side variables reflecting counties economic and demographic characteristics. Specifications that we explored included data on agricultural production and income; citrus production; the ratio of the population involved in agriculture relative to manufacturing; and the principal components of the large number of county-level variables available through the population, agricultural, and business censuses of 1929. We found that including these variables in the regression has little influence on a bank's predicted probability of failure, after we control for the size of the town in which a bank operated and whether or not the bank's location lay within a quarantine zone. Additional results are available upon request from the authors.
negatively affected the business prospects of these institutions. Second, during a panic, being a respondent of a failing correspondent bank may have caused concern among other banks or depositors about the health of the respondent and prompted withdrawals. 30 Third, it is possible that Citizens bank supported only the weakest banks in its network in which case we might be concerned about the causality going the other direction. That said, we found little evidence in the historical record to support this view: the press were not singling out the weaknesses of Citizens prior to its failure). Moreover, it is unlikely that is influencing our findings given we are measuring pre-versus post-correspondent failure probability, and we have controlled for a broad set of characteristics related to the key correspondent banks, including measures that proxy for liquidity, leverage, location, and exposure to loans in fruit-fly infested areas.
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To consider what would have happened if the banking panic had gone unchecked, we calculate failures for several different scenarios. The first row of Table 7 (2005), have found that the loss of a correspondent bank increases the likelihood that a smaller "downstream" bank will close. 31 To bias our results, the unobservable would have to have the effect of making banks linked to Citizens less likely to fail before and more likely to fail after. 32 Although we are able to provide some plausible estimates as to how much worse the situation would have been without the policy intervention, we are not able to identify the exact channel by which the Table 7 shows the results from a counterfactual scenario where all major correspondent banks failed -those in Jacksonville and outside Jacksonville-assuming that the impact of a failure of a Jacksonville correspondent would have had the same impact as the failure of other banks. We construct this "upper bound" estimate of the impact of the crisis in a manner similar to the previous counterfactual only with the indicator of a large correspondent failing equal to one for a larger set of institutions. Under this extreme scenario, we calculate that about 60 banks or roughly 30 percent of all banks in Florida would have failed.
The counterfactuals provides some estimates of further banking distress in Florida absent Fed intervention; however, it is likely that they fail to capture some of the effects that the intervention had on restoring confidence in Florida's banking system. We know from historical accounts that runs occurred in other cities like St. Augustine and Gainesville, and these ended when the Atlanta Fed intervened (Atlanta Board Minutes, August 9, 1929 , p.1621 ). To what extent, then, did the Fed's action halt deposit withdrawals that would have otherwise led to a fire sale of assets, additional suspensions, and a broader banking crisis? Such a calculation would be straightforward if it were possible to count how many banks ceased having runs after the Fed intervened. Since we cannot determine this figure, we instead compute estimates of banks that would have exhausted cash and liquid reserves for deposit withdrawals of various magnitudes.
Once liquid reserves are exhausted by depositor withdrawals, banks might have been forced to call in loans or attempt to dispose of less liquid assets at fire sale prices. However, many of the banks facing runs in July 1929 may have had significant exposure via loans to citrus growers, and Federal Reserve liquidity support mattered. One possibility is that the intervention prevented fire sales and/or mitigated depositor concerns that the banks would be unable to meet deposit withdrawals when needed. A second possibility is that the intervention may have bought depositors time, allowing them to evaluate the quality of banks during periods when asset values were less uncertain and reduce the information problems that can generate runs (Morris and Shin 2000) . One might also imagine other channels.
since the valuations on these loans was uncertain, it is likely that many if not all of the banks facing deposit withdrawals greater than their liquid reserves would have been forced to suspend. more than half of all banks closed on the first day that they were run. Most remaining banks suspended on the second day that they were run. A few opened on the third morning, but none survived three full days.
Of course, once runs spread more widely and a fire sale begins, spillovers to otherwise solvent institutions are likely to occur and a vicious cycle can develop which would push failures notably higher (Summers, 2008) . These findings are consistent with the evidence from the Atlanta Fed's archives in that it suggests that the Fed's intervention played an important role in stopping the panic and from preventing an even more severe crisis from occurring.
V. Conclusion
Just Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that the Fed was either unwilling or unable to provide support. Wood (2005) argues that the Federal Reserve was more focused on the New York financial markets, especially the money markets, for signs of panics. Eichengreen (1992) and Temin (1989) emphasized that the Fed was constrained in its ability to respond as long as it stayed on the gold standard.
Finally, the Federal Reserve Districts had considerably more control over policy at that time. As pointed out by Wood (2006) and Meltzer (2003) Notes: Solid symbols indicate number of banks suspending each week. Dotted line indicates a weighted moving average of the weekly number of failures. The kernel averaging formula of N t = n t-2 /16 + n t-1 /8 + (5/8)*n t + n t+1 /8 + n t+2 /16 provides a smoothed series without obscuring surges in suspensions. Counts include banks in the Citizens Banking Group. 
